New Delhi: Lower than 4 months after the weapons fell silent within the India-Pakistan battle, a closed-door assembly befell in March 1972 within the Oval Workplace. Then U.S. President Richard Nixon sat along with his Nationwide Safety Advisor Henry Kissinger. Throughout from them was Aziz Ahmed, secretary-general of Pakistan’s overseas ministry, accompanied by senior American and Pakistani officers. The bitterness of December 1971 was lingering. The discussions revealed how far america was ready to go to reassure Pakistan of its assist.
Kissinger opened the assembly by recalling the troublesome interval they’d endured collectively throughout the battle. “We went by means of tragic days collectively in December,” he stated, as cited by The Indian Categorical, including that Pakistan loved the goodwill of america.
He was of the opinion that the subsequent six months could be crucial for Islamabad. He believed that an Indian assault was unlikely earlier than President Nixon’s upcoming summit in Moscow, and even for a while afterward.
Then got here an assurance. “We is not going to let Pakistan down. If there’s one other assault, we are going to react violently,” Kissinger instructed the Pakistani aspect, in line with the day by day.
He defined that the Indian ambassador had already been knowledgeable that Washington couldn’t minimize off navy help to Pakistan until India agreed to halt its acceptance of Soviet navy assist. The suspended $87 million in help wouldn’t be restored, however Nixon’s stance towards Pakistan was described as certainly one of “very heat emotions”.
Ahmed reportedly responded with concern over India’s navy posture. He claimed that New Delhi had moved three Military divisions to the West Pakistani border. He additionally talked about that Indian Military chief Normal Sam Manekshaw had travelled to Moscow, probably to safe tools to switch losses from the latest battle.
In line with Ahmed, the day by day reported, India is likely to be making ready both to place stress on Pakistan throughout negotiations or to launch a extra severe offensive. There have been even strategies that India may try and seize “Azad” (Pakistan-occupied) Kashmir, though Chinese language assessments indicated such a transfer could be unlikely earlier than Nixon’s Moscow go to.
The heat between Washington and Islamabad on this interval was not confined to phrases. Months earlier, on March 17, 1971, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers had despatched a memorandum to Nixon titled ‘President Bhutto’s Proposals for Nearer Navy Collaboration’. The memo outlined a collection of affords from Pakistan that highlighted its strategic significance to america.
The memo stated Pakistan was ready to offer port entry and monitoring station services alongside the Arabian Sea, together with places at Jiwani, Gwadar, Sonmiani Bay, Karachi and the coastal areas to the south and east of the town.
Gwadar, particularly, as per the report, was flagged as a possible deep-water port that might considerably enhance the financial growth of the encompassing area.
Entry for American forces could be granted on an “as-needed” foundation, with no plans for giant numbers of U.S. personnel to be stationed within the nation.
Then Pakistan’s Defence Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed instructed U.S. officers that the battle with India had created a brand new strategic atmosphere. Having suffered defeat with India backed by the Soviet Union, Pakistan now confronted pressing safety challenges. Whereas insisting that Islamabad had no intention of attacking India, he argued that the nation wanted credible deterrence.
He spoke of exploring nearer protection ties with Iran and Turkey and bettering relations with Afghanistan. Ghias additionally pointed to rising Soviet naval cooperation with India, citing services at Visakhapatnam and within the Andaman Islands. In his view, these gave Moscow an enhanced naval presence within the area.
In a separate assembly on February 3, 1972, Nixon sat with Kissinger and U.S. ambassador to India Kenneth Keating. The President’s evaluation of the subcontinent was characteristically blunt. “Neither nation must be a rustic. They’re too poor and too bloodthirsty,” The Indian Categorical quotes him as saying.
Ambassador Keating prompt {that a} regional framework much like the European Financial Group may present stability.
Nixon expressed the assumption that India ought to concentrate on its actual problem, which he noticed as China. “India shouldn’t waste its sources combating Pakistan,” he stated.
He admitted that he had been too lenient with then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi throughout her go to to Washington and that, if america had needed to restrain India, it ought to have taken a more durable line.
“I’ve all the time defended India,” Nixon maintained, stressing that India had a good friend within the White Home. The US’ outreach to China, he stated, was motivated by its personal strategic objectives and was not directed towards India.
Turning to Kissinger, in line with the report, Nixon requested for settlement on his assertion that America remained India’s finest good friend. Kissinger responded fastidiously, “That’s true. However we should transfer at a measured tempo.”
Preserved within the U.S. State Division Archives, the conversations from these months paint a vivid image of a Washington balancing Chilly Conflict technique with its deep ties to Pakistan, even within the fast aftermath of a battle that had redrawn the map of South Asia.