Celebrated former CIA officer James Lawler, broadly credited for bringing down A Q Khan’s nuclear smuggling community, recounted the early experiences that formed his intelligence profession, describing how he earned the nickname “Mad Canine” and why he got here to name Khan the “Service provider of Loss of life”.
The previous head of the CIA’s Counter-Proliferation Division, in an interview with ANI, detailed his position in exposing and sabotaging international nuclear trafficking networks linked to the Pakistani scientist.
Lawler outlined how these covert efforts ultimately drew in AQ Khan’s proliferation community. The USA had monitored Khan’s position in constructing Pakistan’s nuclear functionality for years earlier than analysts realised the size of his outward trafficking.
“We have been very sluggish. We thought it was severe that he was supplying Pakistan, however we didn’t think about he was going to show round and grow to be an outward proliferator,” he famous. “I nicknamed AQ Khan the ‘Service provider of Loss of life.'”
He recounted how the CIA had confirmed that Khan’s operation was supplying a number of overseas programmes. Addressing questions on Pakistani involvement, Lawler acknowledged, “AQ Khan had sure Pakistani generals and leaders on his payroll,” whereas emphasising that particular person complicity didn’t quantity to official state coverage.
Lawler’s narrative detailed his counter-proliferation profession, which began throughout a posting in a “stunning Alpine nation” recognized for superior know-how sought by states pursuing nuclear weapons. After returning to CIA headquarters in 1994, he was chosen to guide the counter-proliferation workplace within the European division and was later assigned to infiltrate and disrupt the Iranian nuclear weapons programme.
Increasing on the strategies he adopted, Lawler defined how inspiration from Felix Dzerzhinsky’s “Belief” operation led him to ascertain covert abroad entities that appeared to produce nuclear-related know-how. “If I wish to defeat proliferation and proliferators, I must grow to be a proliferator,” he famous. These entities have been utilized in sting operations to ship compromised supplies designed to hinder illicit nuclear exercise. “We took the reverse of the Hippocratic oath. We all the time did hurt.”
This strategy aligned with how AQ Khan’s community itself developed. Over the many years, the community expanded considerably, shifting from procurement to full-scale trafficking.
“As a substitute of being a shopper of this know-how, they grew to become a purveyor of the know-how,” Lawler noticed, highlighting Khan’s affect and recognition in Pakistan.
He linked the sluggish early response from america to restricted sources and competing geopolitical crises within the Nineteen Seventies and Eighties, together with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and conflicts in Latin America. He rejected claims that Saudi strain formed US inaction, emphasising as a substitute that counter-proliferation solely grew to become a precedence within the Nineteen Nineties.
A turning level got here as soon as analysts offered proof confirming outward proliferation. The CIA then expanded contacts and infiltrated the community throughout a number of jurisdictions with a small group. Not more than 10 officers at headquarters targeted solely on the operation, supported by personnel abroad.
Following 9/11, considerations about Libya, then a chosen state sponsor of terrorism, heightened the urgency of the mission. Lawler highlighted the CIA’s interception of the BBC China freighter, which he famous was carrying “lots of of hundreds of nuclear elements.” When US negotiators confronted Libyan officers with the seized materials, “You may have heard a pin drop.” Libya later dismantled its programme, and he recalled “dancing slightly pleased jig” beside the recovered containers, noting that the transfer doubtless prevented Gaddafi from utilizing such weapons years later.
The broader proliferation image additionally concerned Iran. Lawler described how Iran’s programme relied on designs initially stolen from URENCO, utilizing the identical P1 and P2 centrifuge fashions provided by means of AQ Khan. Khan’s community additionally handed ballistic missile know-how and a Chinese language atomic bomb blueprint. “I believe they bought all of it,” he famous.
This led to his warning that an Iranian nuclear weapon might set off a “nuclear pandemic,” prompting regional powers to hunt their very own deterrents and sharply rising the chance of nuclear battle within the Center East.
Lawler additionally addressed why america tolerated Pakistan’s nuclear improvement whereas opposing Iran’s, suggesting that policymakers might have turned “a blind eye” due to Pakistan’s position in Afghanistan, whereas acknowledging that many choices had long-term penalties.
His account included shut monitoring of Pakistan’s nuclear belongings after 9/11. CIA Director George Tenet and the Counterterrorist Middle ensured that AQ Khan was not offering nuclear materials to al-Qaeda. Tenet personally confronted then-Pakistani chief Pervez Musharraf with proof of Khan’s proliferation exercise.
Defending CIA sabotage strategies, Lawler defined that the company ensured gear provided to illicit programmes was compromised. Centrifuge services have been significantly weak, and the CIA made sure that “issues would continuously break and never work.”
Reflecting on his many years of labor, Lawler famous that he had no main regrets and located deep goal in counter-proliferation efforts. He now writes spy novels primarily based on his experiences, all cleared by the CIA’s evaluation board.
As he mirrored on his personal previous, Lawler traced the origin of his nickname, “Mad Canine,” to an incident within the late Eighties whereas posted in France. He recalled being attacked by a German shepherd throughout a morning run, combating the canine off, and later being warned it was doubtless rabid. “I made a listing of all of the individuals whom I used to be going to chunk in case I bought rabies. That led to my nickname, which I come by fairly actually,” he mentioned, noting that many colleagues nonetheless use it.
He underscored the significance of nearer cooperation between India and america, describing earlier relations as “in between” and neither adversarial nor absolutely aligned. He emphasised shared strategic pursuits and warned {that a} nuclear alternate in South Asia would depart “solely losers” and trigger international devastation.
Lawler, who served within the CIA from 1980 to 2005, acknowledged that stopping proliferation stays important to lowering nuclear risks whilst full disarmament stays distant.